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PANEL 3: 
CHRONIC PAIN, “PSYCHOGENIC” 
PAIN, AND EMOTION 
 
DAVID SEMINOWICZ, AMANDA PUSTILNIK, AND M. KAYLIE GIOIOSO 
 
SPEAKERS: JENNIFER CHANDLER,* ROBERT DINERSTEIN,** JENNIFER A. 
HAYTHORNTHWAITE,*** AND TOR D. WAGER**** 
 
I.      INTRODUCTION 
 
Emotion and chronic pain are inextricably linked, but not always in the 
ways represented in law and culture. Whether chronic pain is “physical” or 
“emotional” can have important legal consequences. In disability and tort 
law, it remains common for claimants who allege chronic pain to be 
characterized as suffering from “psychogenic” pain—a variety of 
conversion hysteria, in which the sufferer is believed to produce a physical 
symptom to communicate repressed emotional distress.1 What do we know 
now about chronic pain and emotion that could inform the ways that law 
makes these distinctions?  
In the legal system, a claimant afflicted with a physical injury might be 
treated differently from one with an injury that is more psychological or 
psychiatric in nature. Professor Pustilnik posed to the entire panel and 
attendees: “I’d like everybody to think about whether a chronic pain 
 
Copyright © 2015 by Amanda Pustilnik. 
* Professor of Law at University of Ottawa. 
** Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Experiential Education, and Director of the Disability 
Rights Law Clinic at American University. 
*** Professor in the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Johns Hopkins 
University. 
**** Professor in the Department of Psychology and Neuroscience and the Institute for Cognitive 
Science, at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Tor Wager participated in the symposium via 
Skype.  
 1. Jennifer Chandler, Robert Dinerstein, Jennifer A. Haythornthwaite, & Tor. D. Wager, 
Imaging the Brain, Changing Minds: Chronic Pain Neuroimaging and the Law Symposium, Panel 
3: Chronic Pain, “Psychogenic” Pain, and Emotion (Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Panel 3] 
(transcript on file with the editors).  
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disorder is a physical impairment or an emotional impairment or both? 
What do we do with something that straddles that line?”2 
The objectives for this panel were to discuss the current scientific and 
clinical importance of distinctions between organic and psychogenic pain; 
discuss when legal doctrines do—and when they should—distinguish 
between these pain etiologies; and discuss the norms in law about the 
relationship between emotional and chronic pain that may be a disadvantage 
to pain sufferers or that may impede accuracy in legal outcomes.3 
 
II.      “ORGANIC” VERSUS “PSYCHOGENIC” PAIN 
 
The idea of a distinction among organic, social, emotional, physical, 
real, imagined, or some other sort of pain is important both in the context of 
research and in the legal context. We begin by asking if such distinctions 
are made in disability and other areas of law, and whether a claimant’s pain 
that is classified as “organic” or “psychogenic” would have an impact on a 
legal proceeding.4  
 
A.      Distinctions in the Law Between Physical Injury and “Emotional” 
Injury 
 
Professor Dinerstein suggested that in disability law, there is usually 
some effort to determine whether the pain is debilitating in a way to which 
one could relate.5 For a given case, the questions that usually arise are “how 
can we know whether something is causing pain [and] how do we know 
whether something is affecting somebody in a way? Physically, we feel we 
 
 2. Id. at 5. 
 3. Id. at 1, 3. 
 4. Id. at 1. A separate issue that was not discussed in the panel but is relevant to the overall 
topic is the relationship between chronic pain, cognitive function, and mood and affective 
disorders. Several studies have indicated that people who suffer from chronic pain have emotional 
and cognitive impairments. See, e.g., Apkar V. Apkarian, Chronic Pain Patients are Impaired on 
an Emotional Decision-Making Task, 108 J. PAIN 129, 132–35 (2004) (noting that chronic pain 
may result in cognitive disruption, which may negatively affect patients’ performance on certain 
tasks). These impairments tend to be relatively mild. Id. For example, cognitive impairments can 
include minor reductions in task accuracy or reaction times, decision making, and working 
memory. Id.  
 5. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 22 (noting that we should look at what we know about 
psychological impairment and find solutions regarding how to handle it rather than characterize 
it); see also RICHARD C. RUSKELL, SOC. SEC. DISABILITY CLAIMS HANDBOOK § 2:16 (2014 ed.) 
(noting that supportive evidence is necessary in most cases to prove that pain is not imaginary or 
exaggerated).  
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can [know, but] with emotional or psychological harm, we may not.”6 
Juries may be able to empathize with a plaintiff’s claim of physical harm 
more than with a claim of emotional or psychological harm.7 
 
B.      Tort Law 
 
Tort law provides compensation for physical injuries, but generally not 
for pure “emotional” injuries.8 Thus, characterizing pain as “physical” 
versus “emotional” can lead to completely different outcomes. As Professor 
Chandler noted, in a tort case, “the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, [as he 
or she] has to prove that their condition was caused by the defendant’s 
wrongful act . . . .”9 In other words, “the plaintiff has to marshal this 
evidence linking [a] chronic pain condition to the defendant’s wrongful 
act.”10 
In tort law, courts evaluate physical disabilities in regards to what the 
“reasonable person” with those disabilities would or should be able to do.11 
Courts do not expect a blind person, for example, to have the same 
capabilities as someone who is sighted.12 But the precise definition of the 
reasonable blind person is difficult to pin down, as “if you’re blind, must 
you have a service animal with you? Must you have a cane? Well maybe 
 
 6. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 1. 
 7. See id. (noting that juries are composed of people selected out of the general population, 
and the general population often has trouble connecting to emotional or psychological harm); see 
also Jonathan P. Vallano, Psychological Injuries and Legal Decision Making in Cases: What We 
Know and What We Do Not Know, 6 PSYCHOL. INJ. & LAW 99, 110 (2013) (noting that plaintiffs 
with psychological injuries are not fairly compensated, most likely because of improper 
perceptions of the legitimacy of such injuries). 
 8. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 12; see also M. Lee Huffaker, Recovery for Infliction of 
Emotional Distress: A Comment on the Mental Anguish Accompanying Such a Claim in Alabama, 
52 ALA. L. REV. 1003, 1008 (2001) (noting Professor Chandler’s thoughts as to how, unlike in the 
United States, Canada and other commonwealth countries recognize torts of intentional and 
negligent infliction of psychiatric and psychological harm). 
 9. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 14; see generally JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL 
INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 11:16 (3d ed. 2014) (enumerating that a plaintiff must prove that 
the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff, that the duty was breached, and that the breach was the 
cause of plaintiff’s injuries). 
 10. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 14. 
 11. Id. at 3; see also Kristin Harlow, Applying the Reasonable Person Standard to Psychosis: 
How Tort Law Unfairly Burdens Adults with Mental Illness, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1733, 1735–36 
(2007) (highlighting the need for a subjective standard of liability for persons with mental 
disabilities that is comparable to the standard that exists for people with physical disabilities). 
 12. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 3; see also Coker v. McDonald’s Corp., 537 A.2d 549, 550–51 
(Del. Sup. Ct. 1987) (stating that a blind person must only exercise due care because he is not 
bound to perceive all that a sighted person would). 
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you choose not [to] do those things. And choosing not [to] use those things 
might be reasonable in some circumstances and might not in others.”13 
Professor Chandler noted that in examining Canadian tort cases 
involving chronic pain, 
 
there is often a lot of discussion about [the] thin skull 
[doctrine].14 This is an unusual response to [a] chronic pain 
condition. It suggests there is an unusual vulnerability in 
the plaintiff . . . . Thin skull rules . . . basically [means] you 
take your victim as you find him, the extent to which they 
have an unusual . . . reaction [is the defendant’s 
problem] . . . . But, here’s where the problem occurs for the 
plaintiff. There’s this other rule, the crumbling skull, 
[which] says instead, if you’ve got someone whose 
condition is deteriorating already, injury arrives, it’s then 
not the defendant’s problem anymore because it was going 
to happen anyway. It was on its way. Unless the defendant 
did something [to speed] it up or [aggravate] it. “It was 
going to happen anyway, you were crumbling, it’s not my 
problem,” says the defendant.15 
 
Professor Chandler noted that a lot of chronic pain cases seem to be 
affected by this crumbling skull rule, particularly when there were “signs 
that the plaintiff had preexisting psychological problems, usually of the 
anxiety or mood disorder type . . . .”16 The demonstration of a preexisting 
 
 13. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 3–4. The D.C. case Poyner v. Loftus demonstrates this imprecise 
standard. Poyner, 694 A.2d 69, 73 (D.C. 1997). In Poyner, a blind man who had never used a cane 
and knew the area well was injured when he fell off an elevated sidewalk. Id. at 70. The sidewalk 
previously had a barrier of shrubs, on which the man depended to guard the edge. Id. Once the 
shrubs were removed unbeknownst to the plaintiff, he fell and was injured. Id. The court ruled that 
the reasonable blind person should have been using a cane, even though there was no applicable 
law in D.C. and the plaintiff had gone years without a cane. Id. at 71. The standards for physical 
disability are not yet clearly delineated, and as one could imagine, the standards for mental or 
emotional disabilities are even blurrier. For a discussion of white cane laws and a trenchant 
critique of the Poyner case, see Adam A. Milani, Living in the World: A New Look at the Disabled 
in the Law of Torts, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 323, 346–53 (1999).  
 14. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 14; see Schafer v. Hoffman, 831 P.2d 897, 901 (Colo. 1992) 
(noting that under the thin skull doctrine, a tortfeasor takes the plaintiff as is). 
 15. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 14; see also Ian Aikenhead, Thin Skull Versus Crumbling Skull, 
AMJ LAW, http://www.amjlaw.ca/thin-skull-versus-crumbling-skull/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2015) 
(noting the difference between thin skull and crumbling skull, and the increased liability of the 
tortfeaser in the former). 
 16. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 14; see also Stephen Cavanaugh, Important “Crumbling Skull” 
and Threshold Decision, CAVILLATIONS (Oct. 14, 2004), http://www.cavanagh.ca/blog/?p=84 
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vulnerability can also affect claimants because “when courts set about 
evaluating the damages payable, they look at . . . the contingencies of 
life.”17 In the cases where a claimant is considered vulnerable to chronic 
pain, the amount paid over time might be adjusted.18 “Causation was not 
established for chronic pain because the court said we think you have the 
personality that would somatize, in essence, this kind of stress, and [that 
you] were going to [develop chronic pain] anyway.”19 
 
C.      Clinical and Research Perspectives on “Organic” and 
“Psychogenic” Pain 
 
From a clinical point of view, Professor Haythornthwaite noted that 
the distinction between “organic” and “psychogenic” pain might be “a 
disservice to the patients that we care for in health care settings [as well as] 
the people that we’re trying to serve in society when we talk about these 
things.”20 Professors Haythornthwaite and Wager shared their perspectives 
on this issue, and Haythornthwaite pondered the idea of a “reasonable 
person” with chronic pain.21 
Professor Haythornthwaite argued that, “while we may be able to 
make fine distinctions in a moment under highly controlled circumstances 
of somebody . . . we see that these things covary quite reliably in many 
different circumstances.”22 To Professor Haythornthwaite, physical and 
emotional pain are inextricably tied up in one another.23 
She continued that  
 
Across many, many different studies, across many, many 
different populations, and across both acute pain and 
chronic pain, there is a robust literature that suggests that 
the experience of pain is influenced by people’s emotional 
state. . . . [F]or example, symptoms of depression and 
 
(discussing Hartwick w. Simser, 2004 CanLII 34512 (Can. Ont. S.C.), a case in which the 
“crumbling skull” defense was applied when anxiety led to physical pain as early as two years 
prior to the accident).  
 17. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 14. 
 18. Id. at 23; see also George Mendelson, Chronic Pain and Compensation: A Review, 1 J. 
PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 135, 136 (1986) (noting the compensation system for those with 
chronic pain). 
 19. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 14 (referencing a hypothetical case).  
 20. Id. at 8. 
 21. Id. at 8, 15–16. 
 22. Id. at 8. 
 23. Id. at 20. 
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anxiety are predictive of the level of post-operative 
pain. . . . There is growing data suggesting that people who 
have anxiety and depressive symptoms—[but not] a 
diagnosis of anxiety or depression in the psychiatric 
[nomenclature]— . . . have different responses to 
medicines.24 
 
Professor Haythornthwaite also addressed a further complication in 
distinguishing organic and psychogenic pain: chronic pain and psychiatric 
illnesses can co-occur.25 She argued that it will be difficult to use 
neuroimaging to distinguish emotional and physical components of pain as 
“we have a brain that processes all of these kind of in a concurrent and 
overlapping way that’s very hard to pull apart, and it’s certainly very hard 
to pull apart in chronic pain.”26 
Professor Wager provided a somewhat different perspective. In his 
view, the distinction between psychogenic and organic pain is useful 
because pain may be caused by peripheral disease processes (organic) or 
processes within the brain itself (psychogenic).27 In addition, pain and 
emotional distress are truly different things.28 Both psychogenic and 
organic pain, however, are real and both can be considered pain and lead to 
similar amounts of suffering.29 He argued that determining whether pain is 
really organic or emotional in nature depends on many factors:30  
 
 24. Id. at 8; see also R.N. Jamison et al., Relationship of Negative Affect and Outcome of an 
Opioid Therapy Trial Among Low Back Pain Patients, 13 PAIN PRACTICE 173, 179 (2013) 
(acknowledging that many of the measures used in this study were obtained through self report, 
but noting that opioids tend to be less effective for people with a negative mood); A.D. Wasan et 
al., The Association Between Negative Affect and Opioid Analgesia in Patients with Discogenic 
Low Back Pain, 117 J. PAIN 450, 459 (2005) (noting that psychopathology in patients decreases 
the effectiveness of chronic pain treatments). 
 25. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 8–10; see also Richard H. Gracely et al., Fibromyalgia and 
Depression, PAIN RES. & TREATMENT 1, at 4–5 (2012), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2012/486590 (focusing on the similarities of fibromyalgia and 
depression, including the drugs used to target them and environmental factors that affect them, 
among other similar features); Gordon J.G. Asmundson & Joel Katz, Understanding the Co-
occurrence of Anxiety Disorders and Chronic Pain: State-of-the-Art, 26 DEPRESSION & ANXIETY 
888, 888–98 (2009) (noting that chronic pain often accompanies anxiety disorders). 
 26. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 9. 
 27. Id. at 16–18; see also LUDWIG OMBREGT, A SYSTEM OF ORTHOPAEDIC MEDICINE 320 
(2013) (noting that pain may be the result of physical or psychogenic dysfunction). 
 28. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 17–18; see also OMBREGT, supra note 27 (highlighting that 
pain may be caused by physical or psychological factors, and that the latter greatly influences the 
way that people experience pain). 
 29. See Asmundson & Katz, supra note 25, at 889 (explaining that the contemporary 
understanding of pain includes sensory and psychological influences). 
 30. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 16. 
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we can’t ask if [emotional pain is] biologically real, 
because of course it’s biologically real. In my world, every 
thought, every feeling has a neurophysiological basis. The 
real question is can we measure it? Can we understand it? 
Can we know what caused it and how to treat it? And that 
seems like the distinction has to be based not on whether 
it’s happening in your brain or not, but in the kinds of ways 
in which a person can be expected to mitigate or prevent 
it.31 
 
D.      Stigma 
 
Although the panelists disagreed to some extent as to whether a 
distinction should exist between organic and psychogenic pain, they 
unanimously agreed that society attaches a certain stigma to people who 
have “non physical pain.”32 Specifically, the panelists agreed that the 
medical communities, legal communities, and laypersons have a tendency 
to legitimize pain that is perceived to be physical while delegitimizing pain 
that is perceived to be emotional.33 
Professor Dinerstein offered the contrasting examples of a claimant 
who is paraplegic as a result of a motorcycle accident versus a claimant 
who has schizophrenia or bipolar disorder.34 In the first scenario, society 
tends to “value” the pain and life experiences of the individual. In the 
second scenario, on the other hand, society would be more likely to devalue 
the pain of the schizophrenic individual or to express the sentiment that he 
or she should “get over it.”35 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., id. at 19–20 (explaining how the distinction relates not only to the different 
sources of pain but also to the different interpretations of physical and emotional pain); see also 
Martin v. Workers’ Comp. Bd. of N.S., [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, 514, 517 (Can.) (noting that the 
Worker’s Compensation Act discriminates against chronic pain sufferers).  
 33. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 29–30 (describing the way a layperson fails to acknowledge 
the mental component of physical pain, and how the courts and the medical community initially 
treated fibromyalgia as something other than physician pain); see also Danijela Serbic & Tamar 
Pincus, Diagnostic Uncertainty and Recall Bias in Chronic Low Back Pain, 155 J. PAIN 1540, 
1540 (2014) (describing the vague and varied diagnoses provided to patients when the doctor 
could not find a mechanical reason for the pain).  
 34. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 1–2 (describing how society accepts the actions of a 
paraplegic as opposed to a schizophrenic, whose actions are seen as “less predictable” and “less 
justifiable”). 
 35. See id. (describing how society’s expectation of how someone handles depression versus 
paraplegia reflects the different societal expectations between physical and emotional pain). 
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Professor Chandler agreed, describing the common suspicion that 
people with psychological problems and chronic pain are “motivated by 
secondary gain” or are simply weak.36 A 1994 Canadian trial court decision 
embodied this suspicion, referring to fibromyalgia as a disorder “often 
found in individuals who will not or cannot cope with everyday stresses of 
life and convert this inability into acceptable physical symptoms to avoid 
dealing with reality.”37 While perhaps a particularly unsympathetic 
example, this case demonstrates how society’s biased sentiments toward 
particular types of illnesses seep into the courtroom. 
This stigma has further implications for the realm of disability law in 
the workplace, as Americans have a particularly strong perception of the 
“ideal worker.”38 Professor Dinerstein argued that individuals with chronic 
pain who request reasonable accommodations in the workplace are 
perceived to be asking for undeserved special attention.39 He goes on to say 
that “as a consequence of that, you are seen or perceived as a less than ideal 
worker—a ‘less than’ as compared to the ‘equal to’ that you would seek to 
be. And that gets tricky.”40 Society typically responds less favorably to 
individuals requesting this “special attention” than it does to those who are 
able to be productive without any accommodations.41 
In Canadian law, Professor Chandler noted, the Supreme Court of 
Canada aimed to dispel the notion of the less than ideal worker in a 2003 
 
 36. See id. at 13 (explaining that society would tell someone suffering from emotional pain to 
“buck up [and] snap out of it”); see also Macon Jones, Protecting Dr. Smith While Treating the 
Chronic Pain of Mrs. Jones: Why the Indiana Medical Licensing Board Should Pass Guidelines 
for Using Controlled Substances for Pain Treatment, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 696, 712 (2012) 
(finding that doctors are concerned that those suffering from chronic pain can become addicted to 
opioids). 
 37. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 13; see also Mackie v. Wolf, 1994 CanLII 8994, para. 222 
(Can. Alta. Q.B.). 
 38. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 8 (explaining how mental health diseases become a problem 
when employers are thinking about medical insurance costs); see also Robert D. Dinerstein, 
“Every Picture Tells a Story, Don’t It?”: The Complex Role of Narratives in Disability Cases, 15 
NARRATIVE 40, 44 (2007) (explaining how employers see disability law as applying to a very 
narrow group of individuals). 
 39. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining that a sufferer of chronic pain would not 
necessarily be discriminated against, but may instead be seen as seeking special accommodations); 
see also Nicole Buonocore Porter, Mutual Marginalization: Individuals with Disabilities and 
Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1108–09 (2014) (describing 
how disabled workers are seen as requesting special accommodations).  
 40. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 2; see also Porter, supra note 39, at 1101 (highlighting that 
workers with disabilities are not able to meet the expectations of an “ideal worker”). 
 41. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 2 (examining the different societal views of a blind person 
who forgoes reasonable accommodations compared to an individual suffering from chronic pain); 
see also Porter, supra note 39, at 1108–09 (indicating that workers with disabilities are 
stigmatized by employers and co-workers when asking for “special” accommodations). 
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workers’ compensation case.42 In an attempt to decrease spending on 
workers’ compensation in Nova Scotia, the provincial government passed a 
law that decreased the benefits of chronic pain claimants in order to 
“motivate [a] return to the workforce.”43 The court based on its belief that 
the Nova Scotia law perpetuated “negative assumptions” about people with 
chronic pain and thus rejected the decrease in benefits.44 The court’s 
legitimization of chronic pain and denunciation of the related stigma has 
had far reaching effects for both workers’ compensation and tort law.45 
 
E.      Is it Time to Dispense with the Distinction Between “Neurological” 
Disorders and “Psychiatric” Disorders? 
 
Chronic pain is just one example of a disease that has both physical 
and mental components. The distinction between mental versus physical, or 
psychiatric versus neurological is often made in legal, medical, and social 
settings.46 Building on the idea of emotional pain and the concerns 
regarding the stigmatization of certain types of pain but not others, panelists 
commented on whether the distinction between emotional and physical pain 
retains any utility, or if it should be done away with completely.47 
Professor Haythornthwaite reiterated her position that the distinction 
should be eliminated, arguing that it has potentially harmful effects on 
individuals who are told that their pain is “in their head.”48 Often times, 
 
 42. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 13; see also Martin v. Workers’ Comp. Bd. of N.S., [2003] 2 
S.C.R. 504, 517 (Can.) (recognizing that laws can perpetuate negative assumptions and attitudes).  
 43. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 13; see also Workers’ Compensation Act, S.N.S. 1994–95, c.10, 
s. 10B. (Can.).  
 44. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 13; see also Martin, 2 S.C.R. at 517 (Can.) (determining that 
the law discriminates against suffers of chronic pain, and denies “the reality of the pain suffered”). 
 45. See Martin, 2 S.C.R. at 517 (Can.) (finding that the Workers’ Compensation Act 
discriminates against those suffering from chronic pain); see also Joanna L. Noonan & Shannon 
L. Wagner, Chronic Pain Compensation in Canada, 4 INT’L J. DISABILITY, COMMUNITY. & 
REHABILITATION, no. 1, 2005, at 4–5, 
http://www.ijdcr.ca/VOL04_01_CAN/articles/wagner.shtml (finding that the holding in Martin 
required all provinces with discriminatory policies to formulate new policies within six months).  
 46. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 27 (noting that the mental components of chronic pain are 
measured differently in the legal and medical contexts); see also Mark A. Lumley et al., Pain and 
Emotion: A Biopsychosocial Review of Recent Research, 67 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 942, 943–44 
(2011) (stating that the concept of chronic pain is accepted as encompassing “neurobiological, 
psychological, and social changes”).  
 47. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 24 (discussing the difficulty of public perceptions when 
relying on the idea that emotional pain has a physical component). 
 48. See id. at 30 (discussing the possibility that patients who are told their symptoms are “in 
their head” will go through numerous unnecessary diagnostic test and surgeries); see also Martin 
D. Cheatle, Depression, Chronic Pain, and Suicide Overdose: On the Edge, 12 PAIN MED. S43, 
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these patients will “escalate their behavior” when doctors are unable to 
identify a “physical” source of their pain, which frequently results in 
misguided surgeries or diagnostic tests.49 
Professor Dinerstein agreed that the misdiagnosis of an ailment when 
there is no physical source that could be identified has historically “done a 
lot of damage,” such as when “supposedly frigid mothers [were blamed] for 
autism.”50 Accordingly, he discussed the need for a “healthy dose of 
humility about what we really understand and what we don’t, and how to 
act on it” when making potentially harmful distinctions between different 
types of pain.51  
Professor Wager pushed this concept further, noting that “the 
distinction between physical and mental [pain] is a placeholder” for 
something else.52 He added that “the other critical thing for me is not the 
physical/mental [distinction], but what is the cause and how much of it has 
to do with something you do have control over or should have control 
over?”53 
 
III.      NEUROIMAGING AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMOTION AND 
PAIN 
 
A.      Neuroimaging of Pain 
 
Professor Wager provided insight to the evolving science of pain 
detection and imaging, noting that many important questions remain 
unanswered.54 Some of the important research questions he mentioned 
included how much control a person has over pain and whether certain 
 
S43–S44 (2011) (showing that patients who suffer from chronic pain are more likely to be 
depressed and suicidal). 
 49. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 30 (discussing the tendency of patients who are told that the 
symptoms are in their head continually go back to their physician seeking a diagnosis); see also 
Serbic & Pincus, supra note 33 (describing the difficulty that individuals with social, cognitive, 
and emotional impairments face when seeking a chronic pain diagnosis). 
 50. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 30; see also Robert L. Barkin et. al., Management of Chronic 
Pain. Part II, 42 DISEASE-A-MONTH 459, 469 (1996) (describing how many chronic pain diseases 
cannot be diagnosed through traditional diagnostic means); Cheatle, supra note 48 (finding that 
chronic pain increases the risk factors for depression and suicide). 
 51. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 30 (arguing that society should recognize that chronic pain is not 
completely understood, and therefore society should not judge those suffering from it). 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id.; see also id. at 19 (describing how pain is manipulated through stimuli and voluntary 
regulation). 
 54. Id. at 18; see also id. at 2 (describing the advancements of functional magnetic resonance 
imaging and positron emission tomography in investigating  emotions in the brain). 
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people might be predisposed to developing chronic pain.55 Neuroimaging 
can be useful in helping us understand the neural basis of different types of 
pain and the factors—such as mood and anxiety—associated with pain. 
 
 
 
B.      Interactions of Pain and Emotion 
 
Professor Wager offered the case of Philip Pizzo as an illuminating 
example of the interplay of the physical and emotional symptoms of pain.56 
Pizzo, the former Dean of Stanford Medical School, injured his back while 
lifting his suitcase onto a conveyor belt at the airport and “went from being 
very high functioning to showing signs of depression.”57 Even with his 
prominent position in the medical community, Pizzo found it difficult to 
obtain a proper diagnosis, as doctors wondered whether his symptoms were 
fictional.58 Although Pizzo’s pain was eventually discovered to be a result 
of a “rare and hard to detect impingement of his sciatic nerve,” Wager 
opines that “it’s likely that [Pizzo’s] experience with chronic pain changed 
his outlook, and so caused his depression.”59 Consequently, Wager argues 
that emotional trauma or pain can cause physical pain.60 Accepting these 
principles as true, additional questions arise: “where does one end and the 
 
 55. See id. at 9 (referencing a Boston and Veteran’s Administration study indicating that some 
individuals do not respond to medication). 
 56. See id. at 16–17 (examining how chronic pain caused Dr. Pizzo to slip into depression); 
see generally Philip A. Pizzo, Lessons in Pain Relief—A Personal Postgraduate Experience, 369 
New ENG. J. MED. 1092, 1092 (2013), available at 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1306467 (describing his year long experience 
seeking a diagnosis for lower back pain). 
 57. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 16; see also Pizzo, supra note 56 (describing how he began to 
develop symptoms of depression due to the inability to diagnosis his pain). 
 58. See Pizzo, supra note 56 (explaining that some of Pizzo’s physicians believed that the 
pain was neuropathic in origin, but without a defined trigger to explain it); see also Ruthann 
Richter, A Physician’s Personal Odyssey with Chronic Pain, SCOPE (Sept. 18, 2013), 
http://scopeblog.stanford.edu/2013/09/18/a-physicians-personal-odyssey-with-chronic-pain/ 
(quoting Phillip Pizzo’s journey in diagnosing his pain, where physicians suggested his condition 
was largely psychological). 
 59. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 16, 29; see also Pizzo, supra note 56, at 1092 (explaining 
that after 10 months of pain and many negative exams and ineffective treatments, his condition 
was finally diagnosed as relating to the sciatic nerve).  
 60. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 29 (stating that physical pain was not more real than pain that 
comes from a less ascertainable and correctable source); see also Susanne Babbel, The 
Connections Between Emotional Stress, Trauma, and Physical Pain, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 8, 
2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/somatic-psychology/201004/the-connections-
between-emotional-stress-trauma-and-physical-pain (stating that those who experience trauma are 
often at a higher risk to experience chronic pain). 
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other begin? Are they really the same thing? Do they use the same brain 
systems or mechanisms? Or are they two sort of very separate things that 
can interact in other ways?”61  
 
 
 
C.      Distinct Circuits for Physical and Social Pain 
 
Professor Wager presented the “common systems view.”62 He stated,  
 
the theory is that we evolved a physical pain system, a 
nociceptive system, [to respond to and avoid injury and 
other threats to bodily integrity,] and on top of that, we 
developed brain mechanisms for representing the social 
world, for thinking about what you’re thinking about me 
and whether you like me or not, whether you’re rejecting 
me or accepting me. Those circuits that process physical 
pain are being co-opted by these social and emotional 
processes.63  
 
Wager argues against a strong form of this theory, proposing instead 
that physical and emotional pain involve separate brain circuits and should 
be discriminable with neuroimaging.64  
One weakness in the “common systems view” is that it seems to 
overlook the multiple potential functions of a single anatomical brain 
region. While several studies point to the anterior cingulate as a region 
commonly activated in both social and physical pain, Professor Wager 
pointed out that this brain area has neurons that seem to respond 
specifically to nociceptive stimuli as well as neighboring cells that respond 
to cognitive demands.65 “If you activate the anterior cingulate in the fMRI 
 
 61. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 16–17 (stating that these questions arose after finding that the 
distinctions were unclear when comparing pain that caused a change in outlook and depression, 
and where emotional trauma and depression causes physical pain).  
 62. Id. at 17. 
 63. Id. at 17. For example, a well known paper reported that emotional pain experienced with 
social rejection activates the same brain pattern as physical pain. Naomi I. Eisenberger et al., Does 
Rejection Hurt? An fMRI Study of Social Exclusion, 302 SCIENCE 290–91 (2003).  
 64. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 27–28. 
 65. Id. at 17; see W. D. Hutchison et al., Pain-Related Neurons in the Human Cingulate 
Cortex, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 403, 404 (1999) (identifying cortical neurons that were 
responsive to painful stimuli in humans, resembling those classified as nociceptive specific or 
high threshold in animal studies); Kristin L Hillman & David K Bilkey, Neural Encoding of 
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scanner, you’re averaging over many, many billions of neurons. Every bit 
that we measure in [a] fMRI is a ballpark five and half million neurons, and 
they do different things.”66 In Wager’s view, the circuits associated with 
social and physical pain might appear similar only because functional maps 
are blurred together at the spatial resolution that the current neuroimaging 
technology provides.67 
Despite the number of questions that remain unanswered, Professor 
Wager remains optimistic that science will “be able to address issues and 
use brain imaging to actually provide signals that can tell us whether 
emotional pain and physical pain are the same thing, and how much 
physical pain somebody is feeling, at least in the area of acute pain.”68 
 
D.      Achieving Accuracy with Neuroimaging Markers of Physical and 
Emotional Pain 
 
In order to get around these unanswered questions, some use 
neuroimaging to “identify something that really sensitively tracks how 
much pain somebody is feeling and tracks that specifically, so it can’t 
respond to other things that clearly aren’t pain.”69 There have been several 
attempts at doing so, typically classifying whether a healthy subject is 
experiencing pain with an accuracy rate higher than 80 percent.70 In a 
 
Competitive Effort in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex, 15 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1290, 1293, 
1296 (2012) (finding reward aversion and adjacent reward seeking responsive neurons in the 
anterior cingulate cortex of mice). 
 66. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 18. 
 67. See id. at 18 (stating that while the image appears to look the same because it is blurry, a 
higher resolution may reveal that they are different); see also Hiroaki Mano & Ben Seymour, 
Pain: A Distributed Brain Information Network?,PLOS BIOLOGY 3 (Jan. 6, 2015), 
http://www.plosbiology.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1002037
&representation=PDF (explaining that there is wiggle room for a theory of a single subjective pain 
region because it is very possible that this exists but that it is just not discernable with current 
neuroimaging technology). 
 68. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 18; see also Choong-Wan Woo et al., Separate Neural 
Representations for Physical Pain and Social Rejection 4 (Jan. 6, 2015) (published in NATURE 
COMMUNICATIONS) (on file with NIH) available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4285151/ (showing separate fMRI pattern 
representations for physical and social “pain”). 
 69. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 18; see also Tor D. Wager et al., An fMRI-Based Neurologic 
Signature of Physical Pain, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1388, 1390 (2013) (discussing a study on the 
sensitivity and specificity of pain). 
 70. See Justin E. Brown et al., Towards a Physiology-Based Measure of Pain: Patterns of 
Human Brain Activity Distinguish Painful from Non-Painful Thermal Stimulation, PLOS ONE 4 
(Sept. 13, 2011), 
http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0024124&re
presentation=PDF (establishing the feasibility of physiology based pain detection, at an 80.6 
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recent paper co-authored by Wager, accuracy was even higher, with 
accuracy between 90–100 percent.71 This “pain signature”—called the 
Neurologic Pain Signature (“NPS”)—was specific to physical (thermal) 
pain, and did not respond to social pain, despite clear overlapping activity 
patterns between the two types of pain.72 Since that study was published, 
Wager and his team have been testing the NPS in other ways.73 According 
to Wager, “you can’t think it up and down and you can fool it with a 
placebo.”74 With regard to the first claim, Wager’s group recently showed 
that changes in pain caused by increasing stimulus intensity were mediated 
by the NPS while changes in pain caused by cognitive self regulation 
(imagining pain to be damaging and dangerous versus non-bothersome and 
non-harmful) were mediated by a separate system.75 With regard to the 
second claim, Wager’s study76 showed that when the NPS tracked relief 
that was caused by a pain relieving opioid drug (Remifentanil), there were 
no effects on people’s beliefs that they were given a drug (placebo effects), 
in spite of significant placebo effects on the pain those participants 
reported.77 In other, ongoing studies, the NPS is similarly unaffected by 
standard manipulations of expectations that create changes in pain reports.78 
Wager said: “What that might mean is with this pain system, it’s not that if 
you decide you need more compensation or you need to communicate that 
something hurts more that you’ll turn up this brain signal. It’s giving us 
 
percent accuracy rate); see also Enrico Schulz et al., Decoding an Individual’s Sensitivity to Pain 
from the Multivariate Analysis of EEG Data, 22 CEREBRAL CORTEX 1118, 1120 (2011), available 
at http://cercor.oxfordjournals.org/content/22/5/1118.full.pdf+html (discussing a study of 
decoding an individual’s sensitivity to pain with an accuracy of 83 percent).  
 71. See Wager et al., supra note 69, at 1396 (indicating that the neurologic signature showed 
sensitivity and specificity of 94 percent or higher). 
 72. Id. at 1394, 1395 (suggesting overlapping but different responses to physical and social 
pain); see also Panel 3, supra note 1, at 18 (citing to their study, where they found that pain was 
specific to physical pain and did not respond to emotional events or stimuli). 
 73. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 18, 19 (stating that Wager’s team is finding that the intensity of 
emotional pain can be tracked in different ways); see also Choong-Wan Woo et al., Distinct Brain 
Systems Mediate the Effects of Nociceptive Input and Self-Regulation of Pain, PLOS BIOLOGY 2 
http://www.plosbiology.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pbio.1002036
&representation=PDF (Jan. 6, 2015) (finding that pain could be tracked in various brain systems).  
 74. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 18. 
 75. Woo, supra note 73, at 1 (finding that pain reports are associated with two dissociable 
functional systems). 
 76. Lauren Y. Atlas et al., Dissociable Influences of Opiates and Expectations on Pain, 32 J. 
NEUROSCIENCE 8053 (2012), available at 
http://www.jneurosci.org/content/32/23/8053.full.pdf+html.  
 77. Id. at 8053 (finding that Remifentanil and expectancy of drug delivery both reduced pain, 
but the drug effects on the pain reports and the fMRI activity did not interact with expectancy).  
 78. See Wager et al., supra note 69 supp. app. at 29 (the supporting online material for the 
article indicated that pain signature responses were mainly influenced by the drug itself, rather 
than expectation of drug delivery). 
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something that is independent of that. That might be useful in a legal 
context.”79 Other ongoing work is determining different detectors of 
emotional pain independent of physical pain.80 “That means that we’re 
moving closer to having a readout of what’s the real sort of acute pain, at 
least, and what’s the overlay of emotional response. And, at least in the 
cases we’ve tested, they don’t turn out to be the same thing.”81 
 
E.      Isolating Brain Circuits for Emotional and Physical Chronic Pain 
 
A remaining issue was whether a pain signature or an emotional 
signature would be effective in isolating physical pain from emotional pain 
in a chronic pain patient. Professor Haythornthwaite suggested that the 
limitation with the current state of technology (described above)82 is that 
the studies involved provocation of physical pain or emotional/social 
pain.83 In chronic pain, there can be no apparent provocation.84 Professor 
Haythornthwaite stated,  
 
the definition of pain includes an emotional component, 
which captures the unpleasantness of it, and what we see in 
people as they live with persistent pain conditions is that 
their emotional life is influencing their experience of pain, 
and pain is influencing their emotional life. And it’s hard to 
tease the two apart.85  
 
 
 79. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
 80. See, e.g., Mary Helen Immordino-Yang et al., Correlations Between Socia Emotional 
Feelings and Anterior Insula Activity are Independent from Visceral States but Influenced by 
Culture, FRONTIERS HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE 1, 6 (Sept. 16, 2014), 
http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00728/full (finding that emotional pain 
could be stimulated through the anterior insula as well as through external factors).  
 81. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 19; see also Wager et al., supra note 69, at 1393 (noting that the 
average signature responses were differentiated from painful and non-painful conditions). 
 82. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 18; see also Mano & Seymour, supra note 67 (explaining the 
limitations in current neuroimaging technology). 
 83. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 19. 
 84. See Mark Laslett, Evidence-Based Diagnosis and Treatment of the Painful Sacroiliac 
Joint, 16 J. MANUAL & MANIPULATIVE THERAPY 142, 143–44 (2008) (explaining that when 
comparing the efficacy of sacroiliac joint tests, provocation was not considered an effective test in 
chronic pain).  
 85. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 20; see also Naomi I. Eisenberger & Matthew D. Lieberman, 
Why Rejection Hurts: A Common Neural Alarm System for Physical and Social Pain, 8 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 294, 294 (finding that social pain and emotional pain overlap in their neural and 
computational mechanisms). 
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Professor Wager concurred with this point and added his belief that “it’s a 
feedback cycle.”86 He also noted that even in the case where he could 
potentially isolate physical and emotional components of a chronic pain 
patient’s condition, it would not change the reality of the patient’s 
suffering.87 Professor Haythornthwaite added that suffering is the real issue 
in chronic pain, and suffering is clearly emotional.88 Thus, although the 
distinction between emotional and physical pain might be much simpler to 
conceptualize in experiments involving healthy subjects, in the case of 
chronic pain, it is unclear whether emotional and physical components can 
be isolated.89 
 
IV.      CHALLENGES FOR NEUROIMAGING AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
A.      Limitations in the Interpretation of Neuroimaging Data 
 
Dr. James Pekar of Johns Hopkins University and the F. M. Kirby 
Research Center for Functional Brain Imaging at the Kennedy Krieger 
Institute, and Dr. Karen Davis both spoke about the current limitation of 
neuroimaging for problems like chronic pain.90 Professor Pekar noted that 
the interpretation of neuroimaging data is subject to important limitations.91 
Specifically, fMRI signals are highly dependent on “inter-individual 
differences in physiology.”92 Factors such as physical fitness, elevation 
levels, corresponding hematocrit levels, and even variations in a woman’s 
monthly cycle can all greatly affect fMRI scans.93 So for example, the 
reading of a brain scan from an individual who flew in from a place with a 
 
 86. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 20; see also Thomas J. Scheff, Community Conferences: Shame 
and Anger in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 67 REVISTA JURIDICA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO RICO 
[REV. JUR. U.P.R.] 97, 108 (1998) (describing a negative feedback cycle and the difficulty in 
separating emotion from pain).  
 87. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 20; see also Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 500 P. 2d 880, 
883 (Cal. 1972) (noting that the infliction of emotional pain results in no less of a compensable 
injury). 
 88. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 20–21. 
 89. See Michael Finch, Law and the Problem of Pain, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 285, 287–78 (2005) 
(showing how chronic pain overlaps with psychiatric and medical diagnoses).  
 90. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 17, 25. 
 91. Id. (commenting that fMRI scans are susceptible to changes caused by individual factors).  
 92. Id. at 25; see also Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: 
Limitations in the Legal Use of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 
271, 280 (2007) (critiquing the interpretational accuracy of fMRI scans). 
 93. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 25 (explaining how various environmental factors influence 
how physicists interpret fMRI readings); see generally Tancredi & Brodie, supra note 92 
(stressing that changes in different bodily systems can affect the fMRI’s reading of neural 
activity). 
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high altitude like Colorado would have to be interpreted differently than a 
similar brain scan from an individual who resides at sea level.94 Similarly, 
very different brain scans may not indicate differing levels of pain, but 
rather may be a result of a “difference in hematic rate, or difference in the 
amount of red blood cells they have because of the elevations that they’ve 
been living at.”95  
Professor Wager acknowledged the importance of recognizing these 
limitations, but argued that they are not insurmountable.96 The first step in 
mitigating these limitations is to know more about the person whose brain 
is being scanned.97 If an individual’s particular circumstances—like a 
person’s residence at a high altitude—are known, then the studies can be 
calibrated to account for these differences.98 Once this is done, inter-
individual differences are less problematic in the neuroimaging of pain.99 
 
B.      Future Research Directions in the Area of Emotion and Chronic 
Pain 
 
Offering suggestions as to how to move forward, the panelists stressed 
the need for additional research and data.100 Professor Haythornthwaite 
commented on the need for a more diverse sample population, as current 
studies lack equal representation across lines of sex, race, age, and 
education.101 There was also a suggestion that the courts could perform 
 
 94. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 25 (explaining the nuances of fMRI interpretation). 
 95. Id.; see also Concomitant Physiologic Changes as Potential Confounds for BOLD-Based 
fMRI: A Checklist, PRACTICAL FMRI: THE NUTS & BOLTS (Dec. 8, 2014), 
http://practicalfmri.blogspot.com/2014/12/concomitant-physiological-changes-as.html (describing 
“hematic rate” and variation in fMRI readings). 
 96. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 27 (responding to Dr. Pekar’s discussion of outside 
influences on fMRI scans). 
 97. See id. (describing the need to control for individual circumstances); see also Stuart W.S. 
MacDonald et al., Intra-Individual Variability in Behavior: Links to Brain Structure, 
Neurotransmission and Neuronal Activity, 29 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCES 474, 474 (2003), 
available at http://drsmorey.org/bibtex/upload/MacDonald:etal:2006.pdf (highlighting the need to 
include intra-individual variability to predict outcomes). 
 98. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 27 (alluding to test calibrations of other disciplines such as 
biology); see also Xin Di et al., Calibrating BOLD fMRI Activations with Neurovascular and 
Anatomical Constraints, 23 CEREBRAL CORTEX 255, 255 (2013), available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.368.6282&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
(describing fMRI calibration methods, which can account for individual differences). 
 99. See Wager et al., supra note 69, at 1396 (describing the necessary calibration of inter-
individual differences for clinical studies of pain). 
 100. See, e.g., Panel 3, supra note 1, at 27 (stressing the need for clearer standards in brain 
scanning). 
 101. See id. at 10 (remarking that the current lack of diverse samples reduces the legitimacy of 
results); see also Carmen R. Green et al., The Unequal Burden of Pain: Confronting Racial and 
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their own data collection and research.102 Professor Wager added that we 
also need more rigorous neuroimaging research.103 Neuroimaging 
technology and tools to perform data analysis will certainly continue to 
improve,104 and the answer to the question of whether the technology will 
be good enough to isolate independent circuits seems certain to be “yes,” 
while the answer to the question of whether a chronic pain experience can 
be broken down in terms of such circuits is less clear. 
 
V.      AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Professor Chandler described several differences and similarities 
between Canadian and U.S. law as they relate to the myriad of issues 
mentioned above.105 For example, she suggested that from the perspective 
of the philosophy of mind, American law tends to lean toward dualism, 
while Canadian law is in some (but not all) cases more materialist.106 She 
stated that “as we’re moving in the direction of collapsing the mind into the 
brain, . . . this is a very interesting challenge that is throughout the law and 
plays out in very interesting ways.”107 In particular, this comparison was 
made on the basis of various rules of tort law that draw distinctions between 
mental and physical phenomena in the United States, which are not present 
in Canada.108 Professor Chandler illustrated this apparent difference in 
dualism/materialism: 
 
This is a rule called the doctrine of mitigation or the 
doctrine of avoidable consequences . . . which essentially 
says that if you are a plaintiff and you’re going to get 
 
Ethnic Disparities in Pain, 4 PAIN MED. 277, 277 (2003) (highlighting the ethnic disparities in 
pain studies). 
 102. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 20–21 (proposing judicial reforms that could spur progress); 
see also David R. Williams & Toni D. Rucker, Understanding and Addressing Racial Disparities 
in Health Care, 21 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 75, 82 (2000) (arguing that better data collection is 
required to ameliorate differences in racial impact). 
 103. See Panel 3, supra note 1, at 20 (claiming that advances such as higher resolution will 
improve the tracking of different kinds of pain). 
 104. See Jean-Baptiste Poline et al., Data Sharing in Neuroimaging Research, 6 FRONTIERS 
NEUROINFORMATICS 1 (Apr. 5 2012), 
http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fninf.2012.00009/full (describing expected 
improvements in neuroimaging).  
 105. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 11.  
 106. See id. (discussing the theoretical underpinnings of dualism and materialism as it relates 
to Canadian and American law). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. (including the Canadian doctrine of mitigation that applies to plaintiffs).  
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compensation from a tortfeasor, you are expected to take 
reasonable steps to limit your harm. . . . In Canada, 
judges, . . . including in the chronic pain context, will 
require claimants/plaintiffs to do what is called psychiatric 
mitigation.109  
 
For example, if a claimant had seen a doctor who recommended that the 
claimant take antidepressants, the judge can cut down the damages or 
disentitle the claimant if the claimant did not follow the recommended 
mitigation.110 In the U.S. courts, Chandler believes that there is less of this 
psychiatric mitigation, but stated that U.S. courts would uphold a 
recommendation to follow the treatment recommendations for non-
psychiatric illnesses (for example, taking diabetes medication).111 While 
this is only a single example of differences in policies between countries, it 
serves as a reminder that taking an international perspective might be useful 
in exploring the strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches to 
similar social and legal problems. 
 
VI.      CONCLUSION 
 
The distinction between whether a condition is reflected by physical or 
emotional disability can have a profound effect on outcomes in various 
legal settings.112 Chronic pain has both physical and emotional 
components;113 indeed, it might be argued that without both components in 
 
 109. Id. at 11; see also Yehuda Adar, Comparative Negligence and Mitigation of Damages; 
Two Sister Doctrines in Search of Reunion, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 783, 783–84 (2013) (outlining 
the doctrine of mitigation); see also Vaughan Black, Cultural Thin Skills, 60 UNIVERSITY OF NEW 
BRUNSWICK LAW JOURNAL [U.N.B.L.J.] 186, 191 (2010) (Can.) (describing the doctrine of 
psychiatric mitigation in Canadian practice). 
 110. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 11; see also Olga Redko, Religious Practice as a “Thin Skull” in 
the Context of Civil Liability, 72 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO FACULTY OF LAW REVIEW [UT FAC. 
L. REV.] 41, 48–49 (2014) (Can.) (describing a Canadian court’s view of a plaintiff’s post-injury 
obligations and limits of a defendant’s responsibility). 
 111. Panel 3, supra note 1, at 11; see also Kevin Klein, Mitigation of Psychological Damages: 
An Economic Analysis of the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine and Its Applicability to Emotional 
Distress Injuries, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 405, 409 (2004) (describing mandatory treatment 
requirements for plaintiffs in order to mitigate damages).  
 112. See Habib Hanna, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: The Disparate Treatment of Similarly 
Situated Taxpayers Under the Personal Injury Income Tax Exclusion, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 161, 162–
63 (2010) (highlighting a form of disparate legal treatment between persons suffering emotional 
and physical injuries, respectively).  
 113. See Rickey S. Miller, Psychological Approaches to Chronic Pain: Assessment and 
Treatment, 7 ADVOC. Q. 148, 148 (1987) (highlighting the dual nature of pain).  
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concert, the nature of pain is very different.114 Neuroimaging studies have 
provided evidence for the emotional and physical sides of pain, even 
allowing us to isolate physical and emotional pain in highly controlled 
experimental settings.115 But for chronic pain, there is still limited evidence 
that emotional or physical characteristics can be isolated. Legal systems 
dealing with chronic pain should have an understanding of the mechanisms 
related to the development and maintenance of chronic pain, and the results 
from human neuroimaging studies can be particularly instructive to this 
end. 
 
 
 114. Pain has distinct unpleasantness and sensory aspects, but even distinguishing those 
components can be difficult. See Howard L. Fields, Pain: An Unpleasant Topic, 82 J. PAIN S61, 
S61–S62 (Supp. 1 1999) (discussing the proper modalities of pain).  
 115. See Naomi Eisenberger, Understanding the Moderators of Physical and Emotional Pain: 
A Neural Systems-Based Approach, 19 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 189, 190 (2008) (demonstrating 
advances in neuroimaging). 
